The Antidotes to the Double Standard: Protecting the Healthcare Rights of Mentally Ill Inmates by Blurring the Line Between Estelle and Youngberg.
This Note is an examination of mentally ill inmates' constitutional right to treatment. It has significant doctrinal and practical implications. In terms of doctrine, the Supreme Court has created distinct standards for the minimum levels of care for inmates (Estelle) and the civilly committed mentally ill (Youngberg). Under this framework mentally ill inmates are constitutionally equivalent to inmates generally, but are entitled to less care than the civilly committed even if they suffer the same illness. This Note explores this gap through the lens of equal protection and argues that mentally ill inmates are similarly situated to the civilly committed. It further contends that inmates constitute a "discrete and insular minority" and thus the standard establishing their right to care should be subject to strict scrutiny. This Note finds that Estelle fails this test. Practically, this Note brings visibility to a consequential area of the law neglected by scholarship. Over half of inmates are mentally ill and yet treatment in prisons is inadequate. The literature at the intersection of health, criminal justice, and constitutional rights has not constructively considered how doctrine should be changed to protect the wellbeing of this vulnerable population. Scholars have also provided little oversight of the judicial administration of justice in this field; there are few reviews of how judges actually apply treatment rights standards. This Note lessens this blind spot by exposing how courts fail to properly distinguish between different standards. This Note proposes that the most promising antidote to the Estelle-Youngberg double standard, counterintuitively, is not the creation of a uniform standard. A standard that puts mentally ill inmates on equal footing with the civilly committed would solve the doctrinal puzzle, but would be subject to Youngberg's inherent flaws and the judicial malpractice in this area. Recognizing the deficiencies of a purely judicial remedy, this Note recommends a solution relying both on courts and Congress. It concludes by highlighting the importance of targeting the primary causes of society's neglect of mentally ill inmates--the stigmatization of mental illness and incarceration--as a necessary step in spurring these institutions to action. Vindication of mentally ill inmates' right to treatment requires that society first overcome its prejudice against this vulnerable population.